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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many corporate managers cater to the preference of institutional 
shareholders for short-term stock price performance, even though this is 
widely understood to threaten the sustainability of American business. 
For these investors, the focus is on quarterly earnings rather than long-
run value that may not be reflected in the current share price. Corporate 
executives respond by managing the business with an emphasis on meet-
ing quarterly earnings targets. Often this can mean avoidance of expendi-
tures that reduce current earnings and generate payoffs only in the future. 
Casualties of short-termism can include a range of investments that 
may be necessary to the corporation’s long-run profitability. These in-
clude neglected expenditures on capital assets, research and develop-
ment, maintenance, advertising, employee training, and customer service. 
Yet because they reduce current earnings and therefore threaten share 
prices, corporate managers are reluctant to make them. This has implica-
tions not only for the long-run viability of American business, but also 
for its ability to compete in a world that does not necessarily embrace 
short investment horizons. 
Amidst concerns about the negative effects on long-run value and 
competitiveness, one overlooked consequence of short-termism is its im-
pediment to corporate social responsibility (CSR). This oversight is not 
surprising because it is entirely possible to be alarmed by short-termism 
while remaining uninterested in CSR. Nevertheless, for those who are 
concerned about CSR, it is important to pay attention to short-termism 
and its negative impact. Like research and development, advertising, and 
the like, CSR also requires current expenditures that reduce earnings. 
Sometimes these expenditures—on the well-being of key stakeholders or 
the sustainability of the environment—can contribute strategically to the 
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corporation’s long-run success or might even be necessary for its surviv-
al. In other words, they might be important for business reasons. Or they 
might be justified on ethical grounds as “the right thing to do” regardless 
of their potential to increase future profits. In either case, a short-term 
orientation stands in the way. Whether undertaken for strategic or ethical 
reasons, spending money to promote nonshareholder interests reduces 
current earnings. Even if there is the prospect of a net financial benefit to 
the corporation, it will not come to pass, if it does at all, until some future 
time. Meanwhile, investors have lost value. Thus, short-termism not only 
jeopardizes research and development, capital investment, and the like, 
but also impedes expenditures on CSR initiatives. Until investors are 
willing to jettison a short-term outlook, CSR seems even less likely than 
it otherwise might be. Corporate social responsibility therefore requires 
shareholder social responsibility in the form of more patient investment 
strategies. 
It needs to be noted that this Article is not about “socially responsi-
ble investing” (SRI). SRI encompasses the idea that investment decisions 
should be made not solely in terms of financial risk and return but also 
with attention to “some combination of ethical, religious, social, and en-
vironmental concerns.”1 A number of investment funds focus on society 
or the environment in their mission statements. Depending on the defini-
tion one uses, SRI investing could comprise as much as 10% of the U.S. 
stock markets.2 There are important questions surrounding the actual and 
potential impact of SRI and its influence on CSR policies, but these 
questions are beyond the scope of this Article. 
In this Article, Part II examines the short-termism phenomenon, 
first from the point of view of investors and then from that of corporate 
managers, and summarizes widely held views about the social costs of 
short-termism. Part III then shifts the focus to the impact of short-
termism on CSR, a problem that has been largely overlooked, and devel-
ops two theories or models of CSR: the “ethical” and the “strategic.” Part 
III also explains how short-termism presents a significant obstacle to 
both models of CSR, which compounds concerns about the impact of 
short-termism on long-run corporate success. Accordingly, it is all the 
more urgent to understand the causes of institutional investor short-
termism, a subject that has not received the attention that it deserves. In 
Part IV, the Article first examines the pressures that institutions—
particularly public and private pension funds—face to meet their current 
obligations. It then turns to competition among institutions for investor 
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funds, a problem for mutual funds in particular. Finally, the Article 
touches briefly on competition among independent investment advisors 
and fiduciary duty law as potential contributors to the short-termism 
phenomenon. Part V is a brief conclusion. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND SHORT-TERMISM 
A. Short-Term Investment Horizons 
Institutional investors are the dominant players in today’s stock 
markets. These shareholders include public and private pension funds, 
mutual funds, insurance companies, university endowments and founda-
tions, and bank trust departments. As a group, they own approximately 
three-fourths of the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations3 and around 70% of 
the shares of all U.S. corporations.4 For some U.S. corporations, the per-
centage of institutional investor stock ownership is even higher.5 
Many institutional shareholders pursue short-term investment strat-
egies. These investors hold broadly diversified portfolios and buy and 
sell frequently in order to realize trading profits. Among all shareholders, 
the average holding period for particular stocks is now very short, per-
haps as low as five months.6 For short-term investors, the focus is on 
quarterly earnings rather than other possible measures of value. Traders 
respond to share price movements and are largely unconcerned with un-
derlying company fundamentals and possible differences between cur-
rent share price and long-run value.7 They are likely to dispose of under-
performing stocks rather than take a more patient approach. Brian 
Bushee, a widely respected expert on accounting and financial disclo-
                                                 
 3. As of 2010, the figure was approximately 73%, and it is likely to be even higher today. See 
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 5. For Google, for example, the figure is 83%. YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/ 
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OR PART OF THE SOLUTION? (2011), available at http://millstein.som.yale.edu/sites/mill 
stein.som.yale.edu/files/80235_CED_WEB.pdf (seven to nine months); Dominic Barton, Capitalism 
for the Long Term, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at 85, 87 (seven months). 
 7. Most scholars now reject the idea that current share price necessarily reflects long-run value. 
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS 
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 64–65 (2012). 
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sure, refers to these shareholders as “transient”8 because they come and 
go. 
Critics argue that short-termism is increasingly the norm among in-
stitutional shareholders. John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group mu-
tual fund family, writes that “the folly of short-term speculation has re-
placed the wisdom of long-term investing.”9 Another observer of the 
short-term approach to investment—and to corporate management—
criticizes its pervasiveness even since the financial crisis. He refers to 
this phenomenon as “quarterly capitalism” because of the obsession with 
quarterly accounting results.10 
Not all institutions subscribe to short-term investment philosophies. 
Some invest with the goal of realizing long-term value. Bushee calls the-
se the “dedicated”—patient—investors. 11  Others are passive indexers 
who build portfolios that mirror the stock market as a whole and engage 
in trading only infrequently.12 Nevertheless, there is broad agreement that 
short-termism is widespread in the current investment landscape.13 
B. Managing for Short-Term Results 
Short investment horizons appear to be a significant cause of short-
term corporate managerial perspectives. Institutional shareholders that 
follow short-term investment strategies tend to favor companies that fo-
cus on short-term, quarter-to-quarter accounting results.14 These share-
holders may also be a source of pressure on those companies to produce 
those results.15 One observer notes that “there is now a growing move-
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ior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 326 (1998). 
 9. Bogle, supra note 4. 
 10. Barton, supra note 6, at 87. 
 11. Bushee, supra note 8, at 326. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 265, 269 (2012). This article presents a comprehensive analysis of the short-
termism phenomenon and a careful evaluation of possible reform initiatives. 
 14. Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run 
Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 207, 213–15 (2001); Francois Brochet et al., Short-Termism, 
Investor Clientele, and Firm Risk (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-072, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999484. 
 15. See, e.g., Samuel B. Graves & Sandra A. Waddock, Institutional Ownership and Control: 
Implications for Long-Term Corporate Strategy, 4 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 75 (1990); Michael E. 
Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, 5 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4 
(1992). For discussion of the literature on this issue, see Dallas, supra note 13, at 302–07. 
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ment to examine institutional shareholders critically and systematically 
as a cause of the short-termism that drives bad corporate behavior.”16 
Corporate law does not require managerial short-termism. Rather, it 
accords management broad discretion to use its authority in the long-run 
best interests of “the corporate enterprise.”17 Only in one narrowly de-
fined set of circumstances is maximization of share value required,18 and 
corporate management can readily avoid this requirement by choosing 
not to enter into transactions that trigger it. The primary cause of mana-
gerial short-termism is not the law, but instead the demands from share-
holders and the effects of other incentives. 
Short-term-oriented investors can put pressure on corporate manag-
ers to produce short-term results in a number of ways. The specter of 
large-scale sell-offs in response to failures to meet quarterly performance 
benchmarks is especially important. Most major corporations provide 
“earnings guidance” to stock analysts on a regular basis.19 From this in-
formation, analysts construct estimates of quarterly earnings perfor-
mance. If, at the end of a quarter, a corporation fails to meet the analysts’ 
consensus estimate, institutional shareholders may sell, and share prices 
fall as a result.20 Managers generally cannot afford the risk of these share 
price declines. Some institutional shareholders may put pressure on 
boards of directors to remove senior executives who fail to produce ac-
ceptable quarterly results. According to an experienced management 
consultant, “[i]f CEOs miss their quarterly earnings targets, some big 
investors agitate for their removal. As a result, CEOs and their top teams 
work overtime to meet those targets.”21 One executive put it bluntly: “If I 
miss the target, I’m out of a job.”22 A recent study supports this claim, 
documenting a strong relation between poor stock price performance and 
CEO turnover.23 Short of termination, managers also face the risk of pay 
                                                 
 16. Ben W. Heineman Jr., Shareholders: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/10/shareholders-part-
of-the-solution-or-part-of-the-problem/29188/. 
 17. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989); Unocal Corp. 
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). See generally STOUT, supra note 7, ch. 2. 
 18. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 37 (Del. 1994); Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986). 
 19. Some well-known companies refuse to do this, including Coca-Cola, Ford, Google, and 
Unilever. Barton, supra note 6, at 87. 
 20. See, e.g., Douglas J. Skinner & Richard G. Sloan, Earnings Surprises, Growth Expecta-
tions, and Stock Returns or Don’t Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio, 7 REV. ACCT. STUD. 
289 (2002). 
 21. Barton, supra note 6, at 87. 
 22. John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 28 (2005). 
 23 . Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, Performance-Induced CEO Turnover (Feb. 2010) 
(working paper), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~djenter/CEO_Turnover_February_2010.pdf. 
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cuts24  or lower bonuses.25  Further, since the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank’s “say-on-pay” advisory vote,26 companies whose stock price has 
underperformed have been far more likely to receive negative votes than 
have over-performing or even neutrally performing corporations.27 Pres-
sure can also take the form of informal, behind-the-scenes engagement.28 
Or it can come through exercise of voting rights or use of shareholder 
proposals.29 
In addition to pressure from institutional shareholders, corporate 
managers are also subject to other incentives that encourage short-term 
horizons. Executive compensation arrangements typically include a sig-
nificant equity component in the form of stock grants or stock options.30 
This gives managers a personal stake in stock price movements. A record 
of consistent earnings performance may also have important reputational 
value. One study finds that reputational considerations may be even more 
important than bonus concerns.31 Managers also have an incentive to 
boost current share prices in order to deter potential hostile takeover bids 
that would threaten their control of the firm.32 More generally, wide-
spread acceptance of short-termism by corporate management and inves-
tors may indicate a “social norm” that leads actors to assume uncritically 
that focus on current share prices at the expense of long-term fundamen-
tal value is appropriate.33 
Although the reasons for corporate managerial short-termism can-
not be reduced to a single cause,34 it does seem clear that the managers of 
                                                 
 24. Steven R. Matsunaga & Chul W. Park, The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings Bench-
mark on the CEO’s Annual Bonus, 76 ACCT. REV. 313 (2001). 
 25. For some corporations, a manager’s bonus may be based on earnings targets that are higher 
than external analysts’ consensus benchmarks. Graham et al., supra note 22, at 28. 
 26. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (providing for shareholder advisory votes on management compen-
sation). 
 27. Joseph E. Bachelder III, Institutional Shareholders and Their “Oversight” of Executive 
Compensation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., (July 23, 2012, 9:31 AM) 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/07/23/institutional-shareholders-and-their-oversight -of-
executive-compensation/. 
 28. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the 
Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective, 13 J. APPLIED FIN. 4, 10 (2003). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregory D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in 
Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (2011). 
 31. Graham et al., supra note 22, at 28. 
 32. Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988). 
 33. See STOUT, supra note 7, at 113 (referring to “the business world’s own intellectual em-
brace of shareholder value ideology”); Dallas, supra note 13, at 320–21 (discussing firm “culture”). 
 34. Individual and firm-specific factors may also be important. David Marginson & Laurie 
McAulay, Exploring the Debate on Short-Termism: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 29 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 273 (2008). 
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many U.S. corporations are concerned—almost to the point of obses-
sion—with meeting quarterly targets, despite the potential negative ef-
fects on the corporation’s long-term value. To a significant degree, this 
results from the demands of shareholders. In effect, investors excessively 
discount future returns in favor of current share price increases.35 Corpo-
rate managers, concerned about share prices for reasons discussed above, 
respond accordingly, managing the company’s earnings in ways that 
maximize current share price even at the expense of long-term value 
considerations. Scholars have referred to this practice as “managerial 
myopia,”36 but investor myopia is also part of the equation. As legal 
scholar Lynne Dallas explains, myopia is “the excessive focus of corpo-
rate managers, asset managers, investors, and analysts on short-term re-
sults, whether quarterly earnings or short-term portfolio returns.”37 The 
consequence of this shared outlook is a tendency for corporations to sac-
rifice long-run value for short-term stock price performance. 
C. The Social Costs of Short-Termism 
There is an emerging chorus of concern among business leaders and 
academics that corporate short-term strategies raise significant public 
policy questions. The central issue is the negative effects of short-
termism on businesses’ long-run performance. For example, according to 
the Aspen Institute’s Business & Society Program, “boards, managers, 
shareholders with varying agendas, and regulators, all, to one degree or 
another, have allowed short-term considerations to overwhelm the desir-
able long-term growth and sustainable profit objectives of the corpora-
                                                 
 35. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, & Richard Davies, Speech at the 29th 
Société Universitaire Européene de Recherches Financières Colloquium: New Paradigms in Money 
and Finance? (May 2011) (transcript available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Doc 
uments/speeches/2011/speech495.pdf). 
 36. See, e.g., Sanjee Bhoraj & Robert Libby, Capital Market Pressure, Disclosure Frequency-
Induced Earnings/Cash Flow Conflicts, and Managerial Myopia, 80 ACCT. REV. 1 (2005); Natalie 
Mizik, The Theory and Practice of Myopic Management, 47 J. MARKETING RES. 594 (2010). The 
disjunction between managerial emphasis on short-term share price and long-term fundamental 
value suggests that at least some companies would be more valuable if there were a change in orien-
tation toward the long term. In other words, there is a “horizon arbitrage” opportunity available to 
those who might be in a position to replace current management with a new team willing to embrace 
longer horizons. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors 
and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148, 148 (1990). Gaining control, replacing management, reorient-
ing the company’s temporal perspective, and then realizing added value from new approaches to 
internal investment policies are expensive and risky propositions. They require large commitments 
of capital to individual companies in order to gain control of management. This may explain why 
there does not appear to be a significant number of investors willing to undertake this kind of pro-
ject. 
 37. Dallas, supra note 13, at 268. 
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tion.”38 In a similar vein, two concerned observers refer to short-termism 
as “a market failure . . . [that] would tend to result in investment being 
too low and long-duration projects suffering disproportionately.”39 
Excessive focus on short-term earnings can come at the expense of 
a corporation’s long-run sustainability. Quarterly earnings are a function 
of standard accounting principles. Revenue enhances the bottom line, 
while expenses reduce it. There is, therefore, a built-in incentive for cor-
porations focused on short-term performance to avoid discretionary ex-
penditures that reduce current net income. These can include research 
and development, advertising, maintenance, employee training, and cus-
tomer-service expenses. U.S. accounting rules treat these as expenses 
that reduce net income.40 Most executives would apparently avoid these 
kinds of discretionary spending if necessary to meet their quarterly earn-
ings targets.41 Bushee finds that corporations are likely to cut research 
and development expenditures if stock ownership by transient institu-
tional investors is high.42 Corporations may also resist making capital 
investments, even though these costs can be spread over several account-
ing periods. Crucially, all of these expenditures can be of great im-
portance to the corporation’s long-term success. The pressure to produce 
quarterly accounting results nevertheless discourages managers from 
making them. The consequence may be stronger short-term share price 
performance, but over the long run, the corporation will fail to achieve its 
financial potential. 
One survey of 401 corporate executives documents the economic 
costs of managerial short-termism.43 Reacting to their understandings of 
market expectations, chief financial officers believe that quarterly earn-
ings, computed according to the Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-
ples, are the single most important performance metric.44 A steady, pre-
dictable record of earnings bolsters share prices and avoids the harsh 
consequences of failing to meet an earnings target at the end of a particu-
lar quarter. Remarkably, executives are candid in acknowledging that the 
desire to maintain share price justifies sacrificing investment decisions 
                                                 
 38. ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A 
MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (2009), available 
at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf. 
 39. Haldane & Davies, supra note 35, at 14. 
 40. Bushee, supra note 14, at 211. 
 41. Graham et al., supra note 22, at 32, 35. 
 42. Bushee, supra note 8, at 328; see also Cherian Samuel, Does Shareholder Myopia Lead to 
Managerial Myopia? A First Look, 10 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 493 (2000) (looking at institutional 
ownership in general). 
 43. Graham et al., supra note 22. 
 44. Id. at 5. 
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that create long-term value for the corporation.45 Many would be willing 
to reject a project with net positive present value if undertaking it would 
cause the company to miss the next quarter’s accounting estimate. 46 
Hence Porter’s conclusion that “[t]he U.S. system first and foremost ad-
vances the goals of shareholders interested in near-term appreciation of 
their shares—even at the expense of the long-term performance of Amer-
ican companies.”47 
III. SHORT-TERMISM AND CSR 
A. What is CSR? 
There is no single, generally accepted definition of CSR. Even 
among sympathetic analysts, key questions generate controversy.48 There 
is disagreement about the role of business in society, the persons to 
whom a business should be responsible, the responsibility that should 
entail, and so on. Even so, it is possible to sketch the concept’s meaning 
in broad outlines. 
The “social” element of CSR is the idea that corporations have re-
sponsibilities to the broader society. Some have claimed that corpora-
tions serve society simply by seeking to maximize financial returns for 
investors.49 It is true that attempting to promote shareholder interests can 
create employment, financial returns for lenders of capital, valued con-
sumer goods, and business opportunities for suppliers. But there can be a 
dark side as well. Profitable corporations also generate social costs. The 
company may pollute the environment or exploit workers, especially in 
developing countries. Because compensation is not required in many 
cases and shareholders enjoy limited liability, corporations may have 
economic incentives to disregard third-party effects as long as profits are 
increased. This is what law professor Joel Bakan had in mind when he 
called the corporation the “externalizing machine.”50 
Once one appreciates that large corporations affect the well-
being—for good or ill—of many people besides shareholders in direct 
                                                 
 45. See id. at 34–35. 
 46. Id. at 37. 
 47. Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1992, at 67. 
 48. Two important general studies of CSR are THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, and TINEKE E. LAMBOOIJ, CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND SEMI-LEGAL FRAMEWORKS SUPPORTING CSR (2010). 
 49. The classic statement of this position is Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of 
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
 50. JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 60–84 
(2005). 
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and important ways, it becomes apparent that the social dimension of 
business activity extends beyond the shareholders to a broad array of 
other stakeholders. Specifying the class of relevant stakeholders has 
proven to be controversial,51 but the pragmatic definition advanced by 
business ethics expert R. Edward Freeman has intuitive appeal, is rea-
sonably workable, and has proved to be durable: a stakeholder of a par-
ticular corporation is anyone who “can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of an organization’s objectives.”52 These include workers, 
creditors, local communities, suppliers, consumers, and those affected by 
the corporation’s impact on the environment. 
A second key element of most definitions of CSR turns on the dis-
tinction between legal obligation and voluntarily chosen conduct. One 
might say that obeying the law itself amounts to socially responsible be-
havior. This might be especially so in situations where a corporation con-
fronts a burdensome regulation that is underenforced such that violations 
are unlikely to have negative legal consequences. Compliance would 
benefit some nonshareholder constituencies—workers or consumers, for 
example—but it would also raise costs and reduce profits. It could be 
claimed that compliance in these cases amounts to CSR, especially 
where profits that exceed the value of offsetting nonshareholder benefits 
are sacrificed. 
The notion of CSR as legal compliance offers little value if that is 
all it has to say. No one seriously claims that the profit motive might jus-
tify violation of the law. It is generally accepted that legitimate decisions 
about whether to respect the law should not turn on cost–benefit analy-
sis.53 Even those like Milton Friedman, who insist that businesses’ sole 
obligation is to generate profits for corporate shareholders, acknowledge 
that corporations should comply with applicable laws and regulations 
and honor contractual obligations.54 
CSR should refer to voluntary undertakings—voluntary in the sense 
of not being required by law—that are designed to create social value in 
                                                 
 51. Thomas W. Dunfee, Stakeholder Theory: Managing Corporate Social Responsibility in a 
Multiple Actor Context, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra 
note 1, at 353. 
 52. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984). 
 53. Legal philosophers have offered a number of arguments in support of a general duty to 
obey the law. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(1985); M.E.B. Smith, The Duty to Obey the Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 465 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
 54. Friedman, supra note 49. One influential commentary states, “Even if corporate profit and 
shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its business: (1) Is 
obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law.” AM. LAW 
INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b)(1) 
(1994). 
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some way. This is particularly important to the extent that law does not 
currently do enough to protect human rights or the environment, espe-
cially but by no means exclusively in developing countries. For advo-
cates of CSR, corporations contribute importantly to social well-being 
when they choose to avoid harming people or damaging the environment 
regardless of profit.55 More ambitiously, one could argue that corpora-
tions have an affirmative duty even in the absence of legal obligation to 
contribute in some way to their stakeholders’ quality of life or, more 
broadly still, “to further some social good,” at least in those areas where 
corporations are in positions to make a positive difference.56 
It may be acknowledged, as critics have pointed out,57 that at least 
some of what corporations do in the name of CSR amounts to little more 
than public relations maneuvers—“greenwashing”—designed to respond 
to pressures from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), activists, and 
consumers for responsible behavior. While recognizing that 
greenwashing occurs and provides little social value, it is also important 
to see that corporations have the capacity to do much more than that. 
Many companies have voluntarily undertaken important initiatives in 
areas such as improvement of working conditions and reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. The idea of CSR encompasses these kinds of 
meaningful activities without claiming that all that passes for CSR cre-
ates significant value. 
B. Ethical CSR 
Given the lack of an agreed definition of CSR, it comes as no sur-
prise that there are several different models or theories of CSR.58 The 
various theories are in turn derived from a range of different normative 
                                                 
 55. See, e.g., John L. Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible 
Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 946, 951 
(2007). In the language of economics, this can be referred to as a duty to internalize the corpora-
tion’s externalities. See, e.g., Andrew Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost: The Real Meaning of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 221 (2011); Beate Sjåfjell, Internalizing Ex-
ternalities in EU Law: Why Neither Corporate Governance nor Corporate Social Responsibility 
Provides the Answers, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 977 (2009). 
 56. See, e.g., Abagail McWilliams & Donald Siegel, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theo-
ry of the Firm Perspective, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 117 (2001). 
 57. See, e.g., Steven D. Lydenberg, Envisioning Socially Responsible Investing: A Model for 
2006, J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP, Autumn 2002, at 57. 
 58 . See, e.g., Domènec Melé, Corporate Social Responsibility Theories, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 47. For alternative views, see 
Aviva Geva, Three Models of Corporate Social Responsibility: Interrelationships Between Theory, 
Research, and Practice, 113 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2008); Min-Dong Paul Lee, A Review of the 
Theories of Corporate Social Responsibility: Its Evolutionary Path and the Road Ahead, 10 INT’L. J. 
MGMT. REV. 53 (2008). 
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imperatives.59 At a general level, it is helpful to talk about two different 
models or theories of CSR: the ethical and the strategic.60 
The ethical model of CSR asserts that the corporation’s manage-
ment should attend to the interests of nonshareholder constituencies as 
well as to those of the shareholders. In other words, this theory rejects 
the shareholder-primacy conception of corporate purpose and manage-
ment responsibility.61 Instead of asserting that the corporation should be 
managed with primary regard for the shareholders’ interest in profit max-
imization, this model defines fiduciary obligation in more expansive, 
pluralistic terms. 
Thinking of CSR in terms of duties owed to all the corporation’s 
stakeholders is often assumed to necessitate “trade-offs” or “zero-sum” 
choices. It is generally taken for granted—often, though not necessarily, 
with justification—that the interests of nonshareholders conflict with 
those of shareholders. So, if management acts in the interest of some 
nonshareholder constituency, it is assumed that corporate profits are re-
duced accordingly, and shareholder wealth is thereby diminished. For 
example, management may decide to install expensive new equipment to 
reduce air pollution, even though it is not legally required to do so. The 
public stands to benefit, but the added expense will reduce corporate 
profits. Certainly, one hears this complaint from partisans of shareholder 
primacy, who insist that CSR comes at the shareholders’ expense and is 
illegitimate for that reason.62 
The flip side of this coin is that acting in the interests of sharehold-
ers by seeking to maximize profits will often come at the expense of 
nonshareholders. For example, faced with a plant that is losing money, 
management may have to decide between closing it, which would be bad 
for workers, suppliers, and the local community, or keeping it going, 
which would be bad for shareholders. Or it may decide not to undertake 
recycling or emissions-reduction programs in order to save costs. In cas-
es like these, decisions in favor of shareholder interests will have a nega-
tive impact on nonshareholder stakeholders. 
CSR rejects the idea that these questions should necessarily be de-
cided in the interests of the shareholders, but complex allocation ques-
tions are embedded here. Under what circumstances might management 
                                                 
 59 . One analysis identifies four: instrumental, political, integrative, and ethical. Elisabet 
Garriga & Domènec Melé, Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory, 53 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 51 (2004). 
 60. See generally David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 523 (2011). In that article, I refer to these theories as the “constituency” and “sus-
tainability” models. Id. at 525, 530. 
 61. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998). 
 62. For the classic statement of this position, see Friedman, supra note 49. 
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of the corporation legitimately prefer shareholder interests over those of 
other stakeholders? Shareholders being stakeholders as well, it is surely 
unsatisfactory to claim that shareholders must always lose. And what 
about cases in which there are conflicts of interest among nonshareholder 
constituencies? How are choices to be made? As of yet, stakeholder theo-
ry does not offer clear answers to these questions.63 
Even so, the stakeholder approach to CSR has value primarily be-
cause it rejects the narrow notion of corporate purpose that would focus 
first and foremost on shareholder wealth maximization. Instead, it asserts 
a broader conception that sees corporations as actors in society that are 
responsible for the consequences of their actions. The complexities of 
this problem cannot command definitive ex ante resolutions, but CSR 
denies that this should be a basis for refusing to insist on corporate ac-
countability. 
From the shareholders’ perspective, the idea of CSR as requiring 
balancing of stakeholder interests might be thought of as charity. As far 
as the shareholders are concerned, it is as if management has made a gift 
of the corporation’s assets. The value of the shareholders’ equity de-
clines, and they receive nothing in return. Shareholders might therefore 
call this approach to CSR the “philanthropic” model. They might also 
label it an illegitimate wealth transfer—from the shareholders to the ben-
efited stakeholder group. 
Other stakeholders would see the matter differently. For them, the 
issue is not whether management might choose to confer gratuitous bene-
fits out of charitable motives, but whether there is an obligation to confer 
these benefits in appropriate cases. Scholars primarily in the field of 
business ethics have developed a number of normative theories that can 
ground these obligations.64 For this reason, the term ethical CSR65 is 
more appropriate when referring to stakeholder theories that argue for a 
balancing of shareholder and nonshareholder interests.66 This captures 
the idea of moral obligation that may exist independently of law. 
                                                 
 63. See Dunfee, supra note 51. 
 64 . For a brief summary with references, see SUZANNE BENN & DIANNE BOLTON, KEY 
CONCEPTS IN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 13–17 (2011). 
 65. For a discussion of various versions of ethical CSR and their normative foundations, see 
Garriga & Melé, supra note 59, at 60–62. 
 66. A stakeholder balancing or multifiduciary approach to corporate management can also be 
justified on efficiency grounds, without reference to CSR, as being necessary to encourage employ-
ees and other nonshareholders to make firm-specific investments in the firm. See Margaret M. Blair 
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
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C. Strategic CSR 
From a shareholder-primacy perspective, ethical CSR is inherently 
problematic. This is because of the assumption that regard for 
nonshareholder interests comes at the expense of the shareholders. Zero-
sum trade-offs are assumed to be inevitable once management deviates 
from commitment to shareholder wealth maximization and turns instead 
to stakeholder balancing. 
A strategic model of CSR avoids this objection by insisting that 
business decisions that confer benefits on nonshareholder constituencies 
have the potential to enhance corporate profits and shareholder wealth.67 
Strategic CSR is thus instrumental in the sense that it is undertaken to 
promote the interests of shareholders rather than out of a sense of ethical 
obligation to the stakeholder constituency that receives the benefit.68 This 
is, therefore, an instance of the “business case” for CSR.69 
Strategic CSR asserts that a long-term sustainability orientation re-
quires that management nurture its relationships with key stakeholders, 
including workers, customers, suppliers, and the communities in which 
production is located. The company’s future depends on the long-range 
well-being of these people and the durability of its relationships with 
them. Business strategy theorists Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer 
provide several illustrations of companies that have invested heavily in 
stakeholder relationships to strengthen the company’s future financial 
prospects.70 For example, a corporation may invest in transportation in-
frastructure in an underdeveloped market to facilitate increases in agri-
cultural production that will in turn generate increased demand for the 
corporation’s fertilizer products. Increased production will mean better 
incomes for farmers as well as increased sales for the corporation. Or a 
corporation seeking to increase its access to dairy products might make 
substantial investments in well-drilling and irrigation, refrigeration, vet-
erinary medicine, and training for animal husbandry in a new production 
location. The corporation benefits from increased supply and product 
                                                 
 67. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link between Competitive 
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78. I term this the 
“sustainability” model because an important aspect is the long-run sustainability of the corporation. 
Because that term can also refer to environmental sustainability, I use the term strategic here instead 
to avoid ambiguity. See Millon, supra note 60. 
 68. See Garriga & Melé, supra note 59, at 53–55. 
 69. For a general discussion of various business case justifications for CSR, see Elizabeth C. 
Kurucz et al., The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 83. 
 70. For these and other examples, see Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared 
Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 62; Porter & Kramer, supra note 67, at 89–90. 
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quality, while the dairy farmers enjoy better living standards. Or, a third 
example, a corporation might spend heavily on improving employee 
health through lifestyle training and antismoking programs. The compa-
ny realizes large savings in health care costs and enhanced employee 
loyalty and productivity, while the workforce experiences better health. 
In each of these cases, the corporations choose to create significant bene-
fits for key stakeholder groups (customers, suppliers, or employees) and 
therefore act in a socially responsible manner. Even if the focus is on 
strengthening the capabilities of key nonshareholder constituencies in 
furtherance of the corporations’ own long-range business strategies, the 
result for each of these populations is enhanced quality of life. 
A strategic model of CSR can also justify expenditures on envi-
ronmental sustainability, even though they could be problematic under 
the ethical model because of the assumed negative effects on shareholder 
wealth. This is because a proactive commitment to environmental sus-
tainability (rather than a minimalist, reactive one) can create value for the 
corporation as well as for society at large. All corporations concerned 
about the long-term future of their businesses must attend to the impact 
of their activities on the environment because large-scale environmental 
destruction threatens the future of all business. Corporations must also 
pay attention to the long-term availability of reliable sources of raw ma-
terials. Some industries such as tourism and agriculture may be especial-
ly threatened by environmental degradation. Corporations that sell direct-
ly to consumers must be wary of the potentially long-lasting negative 
reputational effects resulting from disregard for environmental values. A 
strategic approach to waste reduction and energy efficiency can reduce 
costs, and the development of new eco-friendly products and services 
can enhance future revenues. 
A number of companies have used process and product-design in-
novations effectively to reduce costs while also contributing to environ-
mental sustainability.71  For example, a shipping company may invest 
heavily in computer software and new aircraft and hybrid motor vehicles 
to enhance scheduling efficiency and reduce fuel consumption substan-
tially.72 A computer hardware manufacturer may develop new uses for 
out-of-date equipment to reduce recycling expenses.73 Or a corporation 
might develop new products that allow consumers to reduce their energy 
                                                 
 71. Ram Nidumolu et al., Why Sustainability Is Now the Key Driver of Innovation, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Sept. 2009, at 59; see also Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Green and Competitive: 
Ending the Stalement, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1995, at 119. 
 72. See Nidumolu et al., supra note 71, at 60. 
 73. See id. at 61. 
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costs significantly.74 These are examples of companies that have moved 
forward proactively to identify ways to reduce expenses and increase 
revenues while contributing to environmental sustainability. Although 
they may have to spend large sums of money on marketing, research and 
development, and new processes and equipment, companies like these 
expect to eventually increase their profits and enhance their prospects for 
long-term success. At the same time, they reduce their own negative ef-
fects on the environment and make it possible for consumers to do the 
same. 
The standard objection to ethical CSR—that it is bad for sharehold-
ers—should not apply to these kinds of business policies. Corporations 
do not make these large expenditures, thereby reducing current profits, 
out of a sense of ethical obligation, or at least that is not their primary 
motivation. Rather, these investments are designed to generate future 
returns and thereby promote the corporation’s financial interests. In the 
short run, profits are reduced because these initiatives require substantial 
up-front cash outlays. But adding in the long-run perspective changes the 
analysis because it is expected that the return on these investments will 
eventually result in net gains for the corporation and its shareholders. 
They are also supposed to contribute to the corporation’s continued ex-
istence and profitability decades into the future. 
There is significant evidence that strategically motivated CSR can 
generate net positive value for corporations and their shareholders. Over 
the past thirty years, many researchers have attempted to determine 
whether corporations can in fact “do well by doing good.”75 The meta-
analysis of CSR scholar Marc Orlitzky critically evaluates existing stud-
ies and seeks to correct statistical and research-design inaccuracies.76 In 
contrast to earlier literature reviews that have tended to be inconclusive, 
he finds that primary studies in the aggregate indicate a positive correla-
tion between financial and social performance.77 Reputational benefits, 
improved management learning, and internal efficiencies are identified 
as causal linkages.78 It goes without saying, of course, that these conclu-
sions do not imply that adoption of CSR strategies will always yield net 
benefits for all corporations. 
                                                 
 74. See id. at 61–62. 
 75. For a critical analysis of this literature, see Marc Orlitzky, Corporate Social Performance 
and Financial Performance: A Research Synthesis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 113. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 127. 
 78. Id. 
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One recent study provides particularly intriguing evidence of the fi-
nancial benefits of CSR policies and practices.79 This study is important 
because it supports the idea that strategic CSR may be a source of com-
petitive advantage. Harvard Business School scholar Robert G. Eccles 
and his colleagues Ioannis Ioannou and George Serafeim examined nine-
ty companies that began to adopt environmental and social policies dur-
ing the early 1990s.80 This set of companies—labeled by the authors as 
the “high sustainability” group—chose to develop “a culture of sustaina-
bility by adopting a coherent set of corporate policies related to the envi-
ronment, employees, community, products, and customers.”81 These pol-
icies resulted in corporate governance changes and stakeholder engage-
ment and commitment to a long-term performance time horizon. In con-
trast, a set of ninety “low sustainability” firms did not adopt these poli-
cies.82 The members of this group were matched with their high sustain-
ability counterparts with respect to industry sector, size, capital structure, 
performance, and growth opportunities.83 Using both stock market results 
and accounting measures, the authors found that the companies in the 
high sustainability group significantly outperformed their low sustaina-
bility counterparts over an eighteen-year period. 84  Coinciding with 
Orlitzky’s conclusion, the findings of Eccles and his coauthors imply that 
firms committed to strategic CSR “generate significantly higher . . . stock 
returns, suggesting that developing a corporate culture of sustainability 
may be a source of competitive advantage for a company in the long-
run.”85 
While there appears to be a compelling business case for strategi-
cally motivated CSR, it is important to bear in mind that this model has 
built-in limitations that some advocates of corporate responsibility may 
find troubling. The strategic approach is based on cost–benefit analysis. 
The benefit side of the equation considers only financial benefit to the 
corporation, whether in the form of increased efficiency, enhanced reve-
nues, or reputational payoffs. Additional social benefits, even if substan-
tial, are not relevant because the key question is whether the corporation 
and its shareholders stand to gain value. This means that corporations 
will only invest in strategic CSR if they are confident of net financial 
                                                 
 79. Robert G. Eccles et al., The Impact of a Corporate Culture of Sustainability on Corporate 
Behavior and Performance (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-035, 2011), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/12-035.pdf. 
 80. Id. at 5. 
 81. Id. at 8. 
 82. Id. at 5. 
 83. Id. at 10. 
 84. Id. at 33. 
 85. Id. at 27. 
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gains, at least in the long run. Accordingly, potentially important human 
rights or environmental problems may be ignored because it may not ap-
pear to be financially advantageous to address them. Strategic CSR 
would not expect expenditures in these cases even if the corporation it-
self may be a significant cause of the problem and may be well posi-
tioned to contribute to a solution. Nevertheless, even though some might 
say that strategic CSR does not go far enough, it is important to appreci-
ate that it can have positive social effects. Further, it has the potential to 
avoid the shareholder-primacy objection, although it will not necessarily 
succeed, as discussed immediately below. 
D. Short-Termism, CSR, and Shareholder Social Responsibility 
For investors whose goal is short-term financial returns, ethical 
CSR is obviously unacceptable. These shareholders do not want to see 
corporate management spending money to benefit nonshareholders when 
regulations and contracts do not require it. They are likely to insist on 
shareholder primacy and reject the idea that management has an ethical 
obligation to balance shareholder and nonshareholder interests. 
Strategic CSR is also problematic from a perspective that prioritizes 
short-term financial returns. This is so even though strategic CSR justi-
fies expenditures on nonshareholders by reference to payoffs to share-
holders. The problem is time; the costs and benefits of particular corpo-
rate decisions need not and indeed often do not occur simultaneously. 
For example, a decision to invest corporate funds in the enhancement of 
working conditions requires a current expenditure that will reduce corpo-
rate earnings in the accounting period in which it is made. At the close of 
that accounting period, shareholders are less wealthy as a result of that 
expenditure than they would have been had it not been made. If the ex-
penditure has caused the corporation to miss its earnings target, the share 
price is likely to fall. The point of strategic CSR, however, is that this 
expenditure is designed to enhance employee productivity and lower 
workforce turnover. If those benefits actually come to pass, the financial 
payoff to the corporation—and therefore to the shareholders—may even-
tually exceed the cost. Impatient, short-term-oriented investors may not, 
however, be willing to wait for the long-run payoffs. In the words of one 
executive, “[a]nalysts and investors are focused on the short term . . . . 
They believe social initiatives don’t create value in the near term.”86 
Even when stakeholder benefits can be justified in strategic terms, with-
out resort to claims of ethical obligation, the argument is still likely to 
fall on deaf ears in a world of short-term time horizons. 
                                                 
 86. Barton, supra note 6, at 89. 
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This problem is compounded by the fact that it may be very diffi-
cult to calculate expected future financial payoffs. To the corporation, the 
benefits of investing, for example, in better working conditions are spec-
ulative in the sense that there is no certainty they will actually come to 
pass. Beyond that, even taking various possible future scenarios into ac-
count, it is extremely difficult to monetize the benefits to the corporation 
that flow from better morale, health, and efficiency. Shareholders who 
are already skeptical about the value of future profits relative to current 
expenses may find an additional reason to resist the proposition. 
Corporations are unlikely to pursue CSR as long as institutional 
shareholders embrace a short-term investment perspective. Ethical CSR 
asserts an obligation to nonshareholders even if that means shareholders 
lose value. Investors fixated on quarterly results will not settle for that, 
and managers concerned about the costs of failing to meet earnings tar-
gets will also want to avoid shareholder losses. Similarly, even if man-
agement were to consider spending money on workers’ well-being or 
environmental protection as part of a strategy for the corporation’s long-
term future, the immediate impact on quarterly earnings would be a sig-
nificant deterrent. Thus, an overlooked consequence of short-termism is 
its discouragement of CSR. Shareholders need to be patient before we 
can expect corporate management to do so. Corporate social responsibil-
ity may depend on shareholder social responsibility. 
IV. UNDERSTANDING SHAREHOLDER SHORT-TERMISM 
If it were simply a matter of shareholders changing their investment 
horizons and managers adjusting accordingly, one might be inclined to 
see this as a relatively minor issue. Arguments about the social costs of 
short-termism might gradually gain traction. Legal reforms might dis-
courage short-term orientation at both the shareholder and management 
levels by creating incentives for more patient perspectives.87 Corpora-
tions might then find themselves liberated to pursue strategic CSR poli-
cies and increase investment in research and development, capital assets, 
and other initiatives that require current expense to generate future re-
turns. If investors were to become less fixated on quarterly results, cor-
porations might even have more space for ethical CSR expenditures by 
virtue of their discretion to define and pursue long-term goals. 
When one looks more closely at the drivers of institutional investor 
short-termism, it becomes apparent that the matter is a good deal more 
complex than it is typically assumed to be. Important classes of institu-
                                                 
 87. For discussion of various reform proposals, see, for example, ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y 
PROGRAM, supra note 38; HEINEMAN & DAVIS, supra note 6; Dallas, supra note 13. 
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tional shareholders face significant external pressures that shape their 
short-term orientation. To a significant degree, these pressures seem in-
evitable. Shareholders’ responses to them are built into their existing 
business models. Advancing CSR by addressing short-termism is, there-
fore, likely to present difficult challenges. This Part analyzes key causes 
of institutional shareholder short-termism so that this challenge might be 
better understood. 
A. Meeting Current Obligations 
It is often said that public pension plans are the ultimate long-term 
investors.88 These funds provide retirement income for state and local 
government employees. As a group, they own approximately 8% of the 
U.S. stock market,89 down somewhat from the 10% stake they held be-
fore the financial crisis.90 Some of these institutions are huge. For exam-
ple, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), the 
largest U.S. public pension fund, has assets worth over $225 billion and 
current obligations to over half a million retirees and contingent liabili-
ties to over a million more.91 Because public pension funds are obligated 
to existing and future retirees for decades to come, they are necessarily 
thought to have a long-term orientation. To meet future obligations, they 
must invest plan assets with an eye toward long-term sustainability. 
While pension funds do have obligations extending long into the fu-
ture, observers have typically failed to note that they also have substan-
tial current obligations. Public pension funds have traditionally been 
structured as defined benefit plans, meaning that the employer has prom-
ised its employees pension benefits that are definite in amount. These 
pension funds must write checks to existing retirees each month in 
amounts that are contractually determined. It is therefore up to the man-
agers of these funds to ensure that the plan assets earn sufficient returns 
to meet their commitments to retirees.92 This differs from defined contri-
bution plans, in which the employer commits to only a specified contri-
                                                 
 88. See, e.g., François Derrien et al., Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies, J. FIN. & 
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bution toward the employee’s retirement. It is then up to the employee to 
invest these contributions so as to meet his or her retirement objectives. 
Employees bear the investment risk in defined contribution plans, while 
that risk falls on the pension fund itself in defined benefit plans. 
The need for large amounts of cash on a monthly basis necessarily 
influences investment strategies. To meet their current obligations, public 
pension funds have historically assumed an annual rate of return of 8%, 
give or take a half point depending on the plan.93 This is still largely true 
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis,94 although some plans are con-
sidering reducing their assumed rate of return by a point or so.95 If plans 
do not attain the 8% target, they may have insufficient investment in-
come to pay their retirees, and they may turn to other sources of funds 
such as proceeds from asset sales. Ultimately, the state and local authori-
ties that sponsor these plans—and their taxpayers—must make up any 
shortfall. 
The pressure to generate strong returns may be even greater in light 
of the well-known and much-discussed fact that public pension plans in 
the aggregate appear to be massively underfunded.96 This means that 
many plans do not hold sufficient assets to generate the income needed to 
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pay the pensions owed to current and future retirees. The actual amount 
of the long-term deficit is controversial,97 with estimates ranging from 
$438 billion to over $3 trillion.98 
In the current economic environment, it is impossible for public 
pension funds to achieve 8% returns on an annual basis. Historically, 
over a twenty- or thirty-year period, it could reasonably be assumed that 
a diversified portfolio of stocks would earn an average of 8% or more 
annually.99 But that assumption may no longer hold. And it bears empha-
sizing that the 8% figure is an average; one can never assume that it will 
be achieved in any given year. Since 2008, it has been impossible to 
come close for many public pension funds. Median investment returns 
over the past five years have been 3.2%.100 CalPERS earned 1.1% in 
2011.101 Compounding this problem is the fact that since 2008 the eco-
nomic and political situation has led states and local authorities to at-
tempt to reduce their contributions,102 which results in greater pressure 
on fund managers to produce sufficient investment income to meet cur-
rent obligations. 
The burden of meeting their legal obligations to their beneficiaries 
creates enormous pressure for public pension funds to generate invest-
ment income. In terms of trading strategies, this means a focus on short-
term stock price performance. It also means high turnover rates necessi-
tated by the need to realize short-term price increases in order to obtain 
cash. Although their obligations extend far into the future, public pension 
funds do not have the luxury of waiting patiently for long-term value to 
be reflected in share prices. Nor, with their massive portfolios, do they 
have the capability of identifying companies that possess significant hid-
den value. 
Because it is now difficult to realize sufficient income on equity in-
vestments, some funds have moderated their reliance on short-term stock 
trading strategies. Some public funds are moving portions of their portfo-
lios out of stocks into even riskier “alternative investments” such as 
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hedge funds, private equity, and real estate.103 On average, public plans 
went from 60% to 50% invested in stocks, with some plans now lower 
than that figure.104 Even so, public funds still rely heavily on equities to 
meet their cash needs.105 Downward revision of 8% return assumptions 
has no impact on short-term cash flows. Some plans are also considering 
shifting from actively managed equity portfolios to passive investments 
in index funds that essentially mirror the market as a whole. Plans do this 
because passive investing saves fees and because it is extremely hard for 
portfolio managers to “beat the market.” These are not short-term in-
vestments, but pressures for cash discourage large-scale movements in 
this direction. 
Private, employer-sponsored pension plans face similar pressures 
for cash. These investors collectively own approximately 13% of the 
stock market.106 The company is on the hook if the plan itself cannot 
meet the corporation’s obligations to its retirees, which can mean re-
duced earnings and a possible decrease in stock price. In extreme cases, 
the corporation could default on its pension obligations and even end up 
in bankruptcy. Traditional defined benefit pension plans are disappear-
ing. Among Fortune 100 companies, there were eighty-nine defined ben-
efit plans in 1985; by 2011, that number was down to thirteen.107 Even 
so, for corporations that continue to bear the investment risk, there is sig-
nificant pressure to realize cash through short-term stock trading. 
Colleges and universities may also find it necessary to pursue short-
term trading strategies. These institutions are often heavily invested in 
stock, and they typically use income from their endowment portfolios to 
supplement tuition revenues to meet their operating expenses.108 To the 
extent this is so, they too are likely to have short investment horizons. 
Mutual funds may also have to rely on short-term investments to 
meet their obligations. The redemption-on-demand requirement allows 
investors to cash out their mutual fund holdings at any time. The need for 
liquidity encourages focus on short-term stock performance rather than 
long-run value so that gains can be realized when selling is necessary.109 
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In contrast, long-term investments are less liquid even if they are poten-
tially more valuable because current share price is less likely to reflect 
underlying fundamentals in the short term. 
In summary, various institutional investors face differing pressures 
to pursue short-term investment strategies. This is especially so for insti-
tutions that rely heavily on investment income to meet their own obliga-
tions to others. Pension funds in particular face this challenge, even 
though they are often assumed to be long-horizon investors. Given the 
importance of investment income and the magnitude of current and fu-
ture liabilities, it seems unrealistic to suppose that pension funds might 
give up a short-term focus for longer, more patient investment horizons. 
B. Competition for Investor Funds 
Another driver of institutional investor short-termism is competi-
tion among mutual funds for investors’ dollars. As a group, mutual funds 
own approximately 21% of U.S. equities.110 Mutual fund fees are typical-
ly based on a percentage of the total assets under management.111 This 
means that the larger the fund, the greater the fees payable to those who 
control it. This translates into pressure on those who actually manage 
fund portfolios to achieve results that will attract new investment and 
that will not trigger outflows of already-invested dollars. 
Several studies document that a particular mutual fund’s perfor-
mance—the return on its assets—strongly influences the flow of money 
into and out of the fund. Mutual funds that earn the highest returns tend 
to attract the most new money.112 At least for growth and similar styles of 
mutual funds,113 year-to-year results are important measures of perfor-
mance. Investors rely on annual performance reports. Year-end rankings 
published by the business press and information services are especially 
important.114 Fund performance can also spur movement of dollars out of 
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lower performing mutual funds into higher performing ones, though the 
outflow is not as great as might be expected.115 
Mutual funds that seek to attract investors motivated by short-term 
fund performance do so by adopting short-term investment strategies 
focused on realizing trading profits through relatively frequent buying 
and selling. One study identifies these investors as those who are likely 
to move their money into or out of a mutual fund according to its short-
term (recent) performance.116 Holding periods of individual stocks and 
portfolio turnover rates indicate that investor short-termism correlates 
with fund managers’ short-term orientation.117 Using several causality 
tests, the authors conclude that investor short-termism causes fund-
manager short-termism, rather than the other way around, as might be the 
case if investors responded to managers who pursued short-term trading 
strategies.118 Investor pressures may lead fund managers to choose short-
term trading profits even when longer-term investments might produce 
more value: fund managers “might be forced to concentrate on ‘short-
term’ investment opportunities, i.e., opportunities that are more likely to 
yield positive performance in the short run. . . . [They must] shy away 
from the really long term investment opportunities, even if such opportu-
nities have higher expected returns than those shorter-term opportuni-
ties.”119 
Those who actually manage the individual fund portfolios face the 
threat of termination or reduced compensation if their performance does 
not measure up. Managers who underperform can be fired. One study 
finds that poor fund performance (measured either by growth of the asset 
base or by portfolio returns relative to similar fund styles) is likely to 
lead to replacement of the fund manager.120 More recent rather than less 
recent underperformance tends to be especially significant, indicating 
that mutual fund governance mechanisms function effectively to sanction 
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fund managers who fail to respond adequately to investors with relatively 
short time horizons.121 
Fund performance also affects compensation. Especially in larger 
firms, current investment performance is an important factor in determin-
ing bonuses.122 Performance may be measured by reference to a bench-
mark (such as a stock index) or to a peer group (such as other mutual 
funds of the same style), but managers also report that overall firm per-
formance may be more important than the performance of the portfolios 
they manage.123 
Because of the pressure to meet annual performance targets, fund 
managers will adjust their trading strategies to achieve acceptable year-
end results. Thus, for example, fund managers who are below their year-
end target halfway through the year are likely to trade aggressively dur-
ing the second half of the year, assuming greater risk in their efforts to 
reach the goals that have been established for their funds. 124 “[B]y focus-
ing so much attention on relative return performance that is assessed an-
nually, the industry may be effectively changing managerial objectives 
from a long-term to a short-term perspective.”125 
To summarize, mutual funds compete for investor dollars because 
their fees are usually based on total assets under management. For most 
equity funds, investors respond to short-term performance, moving mon-
ey in or out of funds accordingly. This creates incentives for fund man-
agers to pursue short-term investment strategies. As long as investors 
themselves have short investment horizons, it is hard to see how mutual 
funds might be expected to adopt long-term investment policies. 
C. The Role of Independent Investment Advisors 
Short-term pressures may be amplified when institutional investors 
employ independent investment advisors to manage their portfolios. 
Some institutions use employees for fund management, but many do not. 
In the mutual fund industry, for example, the investment advisor is often 
a subsidiary of the investment company, and the fund manager is its em-
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ployee. 126  This is also often the case with insurance companies and 
banks.127 In contrast, many pension funds rely on independent investment 
advisors to manage their equity portfolios.128 These advisors may simply 
provide advice to in-house fund managers, or they may take on full, dis-
cretionary fund-management responsibilities, making decisions about 
investment strategies, asset allocations, and trading. 
Many institutions evaluate their investment advisors’ performance 
on a quarterly basis, which naturally encourages short-term investment 
horizons that in turn can lead to efforts to influence corporate manage-
ment to generate short-term results. “It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
asset managers focus on delivering short-term returns, including through 
pressuring investee companies to maximize near-term profits.”129  Ac-
cording to one expert, “fund managers—even seasoned ones—are under 
intense pressure from colleagues and clients if they experience a string of 
two to three quarters of underperformance.”130 
Exacerbating this incentive problem is the practice of some pension 
funds that employ several different investment advisors and evaluate 
their performance against each other on a quarterly basis. In effect, a 
tournament is created. One study of U.K. pension funds finds a correla-
tion between tournament intensity—the number of fund managers com-
peting against each other—and preference for short-term results versus 
longer-term value.131 This study also concludes that fund managers oper-
ating in a competitive arena are more likely to disregard or negatively 
view corporations’ social and environmental performance when making 
stock-investment decisions.132 As discussed above, this is to be expected 
when fund managers pursue short-term strategies because social and en-
vironmental performance generally requires current expense that gener-
ates compensating payoffs only in the long run. 
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In the United States, pension funds often engage consultants to help 
them select investment advisors.133 The consultants maintain records of 
advisors’ performance to facilitate selection. Competition among advi-
sors for pension fund business is so intense that it raises concerns that 
consultants might accept bribes in return for steering pension fund busi-
ness to particular investment advisors. Even when investment advisors 
compete honestly for pension fund business, it is an aggressive process 
that emphasizes recent financial performance.134 
The point here is that pension funds and other institutions that al-
ready face strong pressure to meet their own short-term obligations may 
exacerbate their short-term orientation when they employ independent 
investment advisors. These actors compete with each other for business. 
When their clients are already oriented toward the short term, the advi-
sors have strong incentives to produce those results. While in-house fund 
managers are also subject to compensation incentives and the threat of 
job loss, it is possible that they may enjoy a degree of security that out-
side managers do not. To the extent this is so, the short-term behavior of 
institutional investors may be intensified. 
D. Fiduciary Obligations 
A final cause of institutional investor short-termism deserves men-
tion, though it is of relatively minor significance because a relatively 
small number of institutions are affected. Bank trust companies, which 
own less than 2% of the U.S. stock market,135 are subject to fiduciary 
obligations owed to those on whose behalf assets are being managed. 
Courts have developed a “prudent investor” standard.136 Traditionally, 
these obligations have been interpreted strictly, and personal liability for 
investment losses is a real possibility. As a consequence, fund managers 
tend to pursue conservative investment strategies, tilting significantly 
toward large capitalization companies with strong earnings and dividend 
records.137 Bushee shows that banks, in common with short-term oriented 
transient investors, favor stocks of companies whose value is based on 
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near-term earnings as opposed to long-term, future value.138  In other 
words, the emphasis tends to be on easily ascertainable metrics—
accounting results and share price—rather than less readily quantifiable 
long-run considerations. 
It is possible that similar fiduciary duty considerations influence 
pension fund managers to behave similarly. Most states apply a prudent 
investor standard to managers of public pension funds.139 Private pension 
funds are subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 
which includes a prudent person standard that applies to portfolio man-
agement.140 Therefore, as with managers of bank trust fund portfolios, 
concerns about legal obligation and personal liability may motivate pen-
sion fund managers to pursue investment strategies that emphasize short-
term performance. In contrast, fiduciary duty considerations are less like-
ly to be a factor in the decisionmaking of mutual fund managers because 
of the low probability of liability for imprudent investments.141 
V. CONCLUSION 
Institutional shareholder short-termism can cause corporate manag-
ers to prioritize short-term earnings at the expense of potentially greater 
long-run firm value. Expenditures like research and development, adver-
tising, employee training, maintenance, and the like reduce net income in 
the quarter they are made and produce value for the corporation only in 
future accounting periods. A short-term orientation means reluctance to 
make these kinds of investments, even though the long-run success of the 
corporation may depend on them. 
Managerial short-termism also discourages CSR initiatives. Ethical 
CSR requires balancing of shareholder interests against those of other 
stakeholders. Shareholders fixated on quarterly earnings are likely to find 
this unacceptable. Even strategic CSR initiatives, which promise long-
term payoffs from investment in stakeholder well-being, are problematic 
because of the short-term costs. Here, too, impatient transient investors 
are unwilling to trade current earnings for future value. 
Because of the large consequences of shareholder short-termism, it 
is important to understand its causes. When these causes are examined, it 
turns out that institutional investors face significant pressures that con-
strain their investment choices. Pension funds have large current obliga-
tions to their retirees. Mutual funds compete with each other for investor 
dollars on the basis of their performance, and potential investors are most 
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interested in recent results. Independent investment advisors, competing 
with each other for business, exacerbate existing short-term tendencies, 
especially for pension funds that often rely on them for their portfolio-
management services. Fiduciary obligations may also lead some institu-
tions to prefer short-term results. 
This is discouraging news for advocates of CSR because it is hard 
to see how current investment practices could shift to a patient, long-term 
perspective without some seismic changes to the surrounding landscape. 
Pension plans must pay their retirees. Public plans cannot expect public 
authorities to boost their contributions in today’s economic environment. 
For private plans, corporations increasing their payouts would have to 
answer to shareholders disappointed in the earnings reduction that would 
result. Mutual funds cannot stop competing with each other without radi-
cal changes to their business models, and as long as competition persists, 
they must cater to investors who are themselves chasing short-term re-
sults. CSR, strategic or ethical, depends on a large measure of sharehold-
er social responsibility that is unlikely to occur as long as major institu-
tional investors are compelled to embrace narrow investment horizons. 
